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Moorman: Unwilling Gamblers

Around a third of Americans, according to Pew Research Center (Hartig,
2019), view capitalism negatively. All things considered (such as capitalism being
as ‘American’ as Uncle Sam, guns, and Fourth-of-July fireworks), this is a
meaningful and attention-deserving reflection of how people have recognized how
their interests are subordinated to those of businesses and the market. Americans,
as well as people all over the world, have been given plenty of reasons to resent
and question their economic system as it is. One reason, for instance, can be listed
as the Great Recession, during which many people felt the impacts of massive
unemployment and home foreclosures.
The 2007-2008 financial crisis, which correspondingly led to the Great
Recession, was an important moment that sparked a conversation on the failings of
capitalism and of government in mediating the markets. The economic turmoil of
2007+, largely involved the housing bubble and subprime mortgage crisis in the
United States. Some of the underlying contributors to this crisis and recession
include securitization, risky and predatory lending, lack of oversight, and flawed
corporate governance (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission [FCIC], 2011). Under
these detrimental practices and conditions, housing financing mutated into, as
Minsky called it, a “huge global casino” (2008, p. xxiv), meaning it was tangled
with extraordinarily risky financial practices.
Criticizing the Neoclassical View
For neoclassical policymakers and scholars, the ideal economic model is one in
which individuals acting in self-interest and with rationality interact in an
equilibrium-producing manner. Given this logic, the market is largely selfregulating and the ‘invisible hand’ should be left alone to rule. In this line of
thought, a financial crisis is an abnormality or exception to the rule. The
assumptions made, in this regard, are highly unrealistic for the real international
political economy.
It is cases such as the 2007+ recession that clearly delegitimize and
invalidate the neoclassical synthesis, that in application means having a tunnel
vision leading to precarious policy implications and misleading theoretical
interpretations. Indeed, a common response concerning the Great Depression (held
by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and economist Hans Arndt, for example) was in
part blaming protectionism for economic turmoil. However, as indicated by
Strange (1998), protectionist sentiment arose as a consequence of public frustration
because of economic turmoil that was already in motion; in other words,
protectionist policies were “a symptom of economic pain, not a cause of it” (p. 87).
Similarly, during the Great Recession, blind-sided “pro-marketeers” such as
economist Jeffery Sachs and journalist David Lascelles also preferred to blame the
state rather than the nature of the market (Strange, 1998, p. 11).
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In contrast, exploring systematic explanations, which to be clear does not
equate to having a deterministic approach (i.e., arguing the “inevitability” of
something), can offer invaluable insights into why a financial crisis and recession
happens. Fundamentally, for this paper, this means analyzing the internal
conditions of financial capitalism conducive to crisis and recession as well as how
that has changed over time.
Financial Instability and Institutional Change
Financial instability is observable through prima facie evidence of historical
experience but also makes sense theoretically. In establishing such, the literature
of Blyth concerning institutional change is helpful in illuminating how a neoliberal
shift (which encompassed large-scale deregulation and liberalization) came about.
In this resulting neoliberal environment, pivotal transformations materialized in a
specific brand of financial capitalism, which Minsky tied to inherent instability and
crisis-proneness of the economic system.
Counter Double Movement
Polyani described, as outlined by Blyth (2002), the notion of a ‘double movement’
through which the people of a disembedded society, market-oriented and
commodified as a result of capitalism, utilized state authority to re-embed
themselves (in other words, change the political and economic climate).
Embedding and disembedding describe a process in which something is replanted
or excluded (respectively) from a social dimension. In essence, as Streeck (2017)
would describe it in the contemporary contexts of the debt state, it is the struggle
between Staatsvolk and Marktvolk or the competing interests between the “general
citizenry” and “people of the market” (p. 80). For Polyani summarized by Blyth
(2002), re-embedding brought about political welfarism also known as embedded
liberalism.
Since Polyani’s meaningful contributions in the mid-twentieth century,
there has been another political transformation, a double movement “reversal” or
“counter double movement” as elaborated by Blyth (2002, pp. 4-5). Just as the
1920s and 1930s led to a shift from classical to embedded liberalism, the
1970/1980s led to one from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism (or from
Keynesian to Hayekian economics), which like its conservative predecessor
sanctifies the market and values massive capital movement and volume (Blyth,
2002; Streeck, 2017). Streeck (2014) describes this fairly recent counter double
movement and noticeable triumph of Marktvolk by writing “business reorganized
itself as a collective agent” and used their influence and power to push for the
“demobilization of the state and labor as economic agents” (p. 14).
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Around the same time as this neoliberal shift (in the 1980s), related
processes of financialization and marketization took place (Streeck, 2014; 2017).
Financialization is associated with an increasingly international scope of financial
markets and the incorporation of improved technology in financial activity. On the
other hand, marketization is a type of disembedding where market rationality
permeates other (such as social or political) bounds. These developments of
neoliberalism are integral to financial capitalism and have meant minimal
regulation and a “hands-off” government in certain areas, which is why
underhanded and irresponsible financial practices have been able to occur to such
a gross extent.
The Financial Instability Hypothesis
In identifying the defects of applied capitalism, Keynes explored
underemployment and inequality; since then, Minsky has expanded this list to also
include financial instability (Minsky, 2008). Minsky’s Financial Instability
Hypothesis (FIH) considers the implications of financial capitalism or “moneymanager capitalism” (2008, pp. xxii-xxiii), the critical components of which
manifest endogenous instability and naturally-occurring crises. In clarifying FIH,
Minsky (1992) specified two theorems: one which stresses the significant influence
of financial institutions and regimes and another which, on a systematic level,
indicates a tendency for “prolonged prosperity” to induce conditions that, in turn,
causes instability (p. 8).
In order to better understand FIH, it is necessary to consider the underlying
environment that Minsky observed. Under financial capitalism, liabilities are
integral aspects of the investment process and movement of capital (Caverzasi,
2014). In investment activity, and particularly intensified by the financialization
movement, “money is connected with financing through time” (Minsky, 1992, p.
3) meaning there is a “veil of money” (Keynes, 1932, as cited in Minsky, 1982, p.
61) amid real assets. In other words, money is also a “type of bond” (Minsky, 2008,
p. 250) that entails speculation and is impacted by factors such as uncertainty,
confidence, and perception. This is the key distinguishing feature of the functioning
“Wall Street Paradigm” (in contrast to the “Village Fair Paradigm”), where a
market is defined by complex financial institutions that interact with money in a
way that far exceeds being “merely an expediter of transactions” (Minsky, 1982, p.
61).
In describing the context of financial instability, Minsky (1992; 1998;
2008) clarified different categorizations of finance including hedge, speculative,
and Ponzi (see Table 1 for more detailed definitions). In relation to payment
commitments, correspondingly they entail generating enough to pay
principal/interest, just the interest (meaning rolling over debt), and not even the
interest (meaning greater debt). It is under unsustainable speculative and, to a more
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severe extent, Ponzi financing that structural conditions of a “deviation amplifying
system” are propagated (Minsky, 1992, p. 7).
Table 1
Minsky’s Types of Finance Units
TYPE
Hedge

Speculative

Ponzi

DEFINITIONS
➢ “cash flows from operations are expected to be large enough to meet
the payment commitments on debts” (Minsky, 1982, p. 66)
➢ “cash flows from operations are not expected to be large enough to meet
payment commitments, even though the present value of expected cash
receipts is greater than the present value of payment commitments”
(Minsky, 1982, p. 66)
➢ “cash flows from operations are not sufficient to fulfill either the
repayment of principal or the interest due on outstanding debts by their
cash flows from operations” (Minsky, 1992, p. 7)

In addition to the role of money-managers and money and significance of
the type of financing, also vital has been the increasingly blurred nature of
commercial and investment banking, the distinction between which, Minsky
(2008) indicated, has become “artificial” and is continually dissolving (p. 252).
Indeed, Strange (1998) listed this, which she called the “end of banking,” as one
key transformation that has occurred in the international political economy (p. 9).
In Minsky (2008)’s analysis, he also discussed the dominance of markets over
banks and the increasing consolidation of banks as causes of concern.
Considering such components, Minsky (1982) argued that drawn-out
economic success and stability actually help create the problematic conditions
under which a crisis may occur. For instance, optimism and confidence during
economic stability may lead to a “shift of portfolio preference” towards
speculative/Ponzi financing (Caverzasi, 2014; Minksky, 1982, p. 106). This shift
from “fear toward greed” or from cautious and responsible to risky and unethical
financing, was escalated due to false confidence spurred by public officials such as
Alan Greenspan and policies such as the New Monetary Consensus, decreasing
interest rates post-dot.com bubble burst, and the Long-Term Capital Management
rescue (Minsky, 2008, p. xxiv). Furthermore, even when a crisis is curbed, dodgy
practices are legitimized and likely to continue (Minsky, 2008). In the aftermath of
the 2007-2008 crisis and then the recession, as mentioned by Drezner (2012),
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discourse was still very pro-free-market. Also, recovery entailed quantitative
easing (Drezner, 2012), which Streeck (2014) demonstrated is not sustainable. In
these regards, “stability is destabilizing” (Minsky, 2008, p. xii) and financial
capitalism is “dying… from an overdose of itself” (Streeck, 2014, p. 55).
As summed up by Minsky (1982), inherent instability is explained through
two factors: “market relations that enter into the investment process” (illustrated
by Money Manager Capitalism or the Wall Street Paradigm) and how “the liability
structure commits the cash flows that result from producing and distributing
output” (as seen in speculative/Ponzi financing) (p. xvi). Under the conditions and
with the components of financial capitalism discussed, the ramifications (as in the
case of the Great Recession for example) may include lacking oversight/regulation,
securitization, continually risky practices, insufficient depositor surveillance, and
more (Minsky, 1982; 2008).
A Global ‘Good Financial Society’?
Minsky’s solution for a better mode of capitalism lies in certain “circuit breakers”
including “convention, constraints, and interventions” (Minsky et al., 1994 and
Minsky & Ferri, 1991, as cited in Minsky, 2008, p. xvii). However, as recognized
by Strange (1998) in reference to the 1990s, there may be “more understanding”
but “no more willingness and less capability” (p. 90) in actually dealing with
financial crisis. Although capability, through multilateral economic institutions and
regimes, may be more robust and extensive, the issue of “willingness” still often
prevails. Helleiner (1994) exemplified such a point in examining 1970s efforts to
establish international cooperative controls; despite multilaterally acknowledging
the dangers of rapid and unrestrained capital flows, controls were “politically
difficult to implement” (p. 121). In end, the United States blocked such an attempt
and instead pushed neoliberal policies to further liberalize the global economy.
More recently, Streeck (2014) mentioned how the summits following the 20072008 crisis and up to that point were, in general, inconsequential and insignificant.
Even if these ‘circuit-breakers’ prove themself politically practical in application,
Streeck (2014; 2017) also noted a valuable concern in how increasingly delegating
state authority to KIEOs (Keystone International Economic Organizations) also
means insulating the delegated policy-making areas from democratic input.
Inevitability or Structural Tendency?
Although it has been established that the 2007+ recession was no random mishap,
it would be problematic to simply label the occasional crisis as the inevitable and
inescapable result of nature. The issue with this economic deterministic language
is that it neglects the variable of agency and assumes permanency in a likely
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impermanent system. Those throwing it around haplessly are also the ones making
the “end of history” fallacy (referring to Fukuyama in Blyth, 2002, p. 4). As Minsky
argued, saying “capitalism is inherently flawed” does not mean economic disaster
might “need not happen” (Minsky 1982, p. vii). At the same time, crises and
financial instability are the results of systematic conditions from which a structural
tendency can be reasonably presumed.
Conclusion
The central argument explored within this paper does not lie within the conflict
between pessimism and optimism (as Strange [1998] unfortunately worded it) or
of being either an abnormality of a working system or an inevitable attribute of a
faulty one. Rather, the major takeaway point is that financial instability and the
possibility of erupting into financial crisis and recession is a natural effect of
financial capitalism, a mode cultivated from the neoliberal counter double
movement. The causes of the 2007-2008 crisis and recession, namely “over-hasty”
liberalization and insufficient oversight, can also be observed in other crises
(Strange, 1998, p. 81). The 2007+ case in particular as noted by Streeck (2014),
however, showed that in this era of financial capitalism, firms are not just “too big
to fail” but also “too big to jail” (p. 61).
Since the Great Recession’s slow recovery, many of the components and
conditions which bloomed into crisis still exist. Safeguards against economic
disaster are not to be taken for granted, particularly if, as Minsky (2008) warned,
“that dangerous ‘free market’ ideology came to dominate policy,” which it has and
continues to (p. xviii). Indeed, there have already been visible signs of dismantling
post-crisis safeguards such as the ones in the Dodd-Frank law as a part of the Trump
administration’s agenda of deregulation (Rappeport & Flitter, 2018).
Taking into account the plethora of unethical and risky behaviors practiced
in financial capitalism, Strange (1998) used the term “casino economy,” its
inhabitants “involuntary gamblers” (p. 5; p. 4). Like gambling, redistribution takes
place, the greatest cost shouldered by the people of a lower economic class
(“oligarchic redistribution” that Streeck discussed comes to mind [2014, p. 59]).
Average citizens or Staatsvolk are the “true losers” of an “unfair game” (Minsky,
2008, p. 279). Nothing is really inevitable, but it can be likely to end poorly and,
considering the issue of moral hazard, unevenly hurt those passive and unwilling
gamblers compared to the apathetic dice-rollers (as was the case in 2007-2008).
Using loaded dice does not ensure they will land a certain way, but it creates the
conditions to gravitate toward one end. Similarly, financial capitalism is “loaded”
in a way in which riskier types of financing and unethical banking practices are
instigated and conveniently exist within an ideological paradigm that religiously
advocates for deregulation and limited oversight.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/tdr/vol9/iss1/2

6

Moorman: Unwilling Gamblers

References
Blyth, M. (2002). Great transformations: Economic ideas and institutional change
in the twentieth century. Cambridge University Press.
Caverzasi, E. (2014). Minsky and the subprime mortgage crisis: The financial
instability hypothesis in the era of financialization. Levy Economics
Institute, 1-23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2430259
Drezner, D. W. (2012). The irony of global economic governance: The system
worked. Council on Foreign Relations, 1-22.
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. (2011). The financial crisis inquiry report:
Final report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial
and
Economic
Crisis
in
the
United
States.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
Hartig, H. (2019, June 25). Stark partisan divisions in Americans’ views of
‘socialism,’
‘capitalism.’
Pew
Research
Center.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/25/stark-partisandivisions-in-americans views-of-socialism-capitalism/
Helleiner, E. (1994). States and the reemergence of global finance: From Bretton
Woods to the 1990s. Cornell University Press.
Minsky, H. P. (1992). The financial instability hypothesis. Levy Economics
Institute, 1-9. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.161024
Minsky, H. P. (1982). Can “it” happen again?: Essays on instability and finance.
M. E. Sharpe. Minsky, H. P. (2008). Stabilizing an unstable economy. McGrawHill.
Rappeport, A., & Flitter, E. (2018, May 22). Congress approves first big DoddFrank
rollback.
The
New
York
Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/congress-passes-doddfrank-rollback-for smaller-banks.html
Strange, S. (1998). Mad money: When markets outgrow governments. The
University of Michigan Press.
Streeck, W. (2014). How will capitalism end? New Left Review, (87), 35-64.
Streeck, W. (2017). Buying time: The delayed crisis of democratic capitalism (2nd
edition). Verso.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

7

